Between ourselves : second-person issues in the study of consciousness

By Evan Thompson. 2001

139 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/847bc91b188c42be78bd929b0f40c7f457ec4b77

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Citations in the corpus

Life and mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. A tribute to Francisco Varela (2004, background): “…life and work, from this early paper to his last writings on his own illness and liver-transplant experience (Varela, 2001), is that he never lost sight of this point that the mind–body problem is not only a philosophical problem, or a scientific problem, but also a problem of direct experience.”
What a Dog Can Do: Children with Autism and Therapy Dogs in Social Interaction (2010, background): “Philosopher Natalie Depraz, a Husserlian phenomenologist, calls this kind of embodied and transformative intersubjectivity ‘‘self-alteration,’’ a consciousness of ‘‘having been altered’’ that develops only retrospectively (Depraz 2001:170), and I might add, narratively.”
The musical art of infant conversation: Narrating in the time of sympathetic experience, without rational interpretation, before words (2008, background): “They are rich in the intersubjective, the “I-Thou” responsibilities that Martin Buber (1958) identifies as the origin of all in life that is both good and beautiful, the space “between ourselves” that the philosopher Evan Thompson and his colleagues bring to the attention of psychologists (Thompson,”
What are the benefits of mindfulness? A practice review of psychotherapy-related research. (2011, background): “Mindfulness and intersubjectivity are similar in that they both enable a sense of connection with others (Thompson, 2001), or what Thich Nhat Hanh (1987) calls interbeing.”
Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience (2005, background): “The remaining ideas were presented by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991), by Thompson, Palacios, and Varela (1992), and were elaborated by Varela and Thompson in a number of subsequent papers (e.g., Varela 1991, 1997; Thompson 2001; Thompson and Varela 2001; Varela and Thompson 2003).”
Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2003, background): “Ironically, it is as if one discussion of knowing the other does not know about the other discussion (but see the essays in Thompson 2001 for an excellent exception to this problem).”