Back Door Links Between Directors and Executive Compensation

By David F. Larckera, Scott A. Richardsona, Andrew J. Searyb. 2005

111 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/84374ad68d0deb31bdbfad8cd60f7ca53b1c3eff

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Citations in the corpus

Social Networks in the Boardroom (2013, unknown): “Barnea and Guedj show that connected firms pay their CEOs more, and Liu (2008) likewise finds that better-connected CEOs receive higher compensation (see also Larcker et al. 2005).”
Sell‐Side School Ties (2010, unknown): “links among directors across firms (as in Larcker et al. (2005) and Conyon and Muldoon (2006)), or direct and indirect links between board members and”
The Small World of Investing: Board Connections and Mutual Fund Returns (2007, unknown): “…typically isolated by looking at direct board interlocks between firms (as in Hallock (1997), "back-door" links among directors across firms (as in Larcker et al. (2005) and Conyon and Muldoon (2006)), or direct and indirect links between board members and government agencies or officials (as in…”
Board Interlocks and Earnings Management Contagion (2013, background): “…earnings, directors linked to the manipulating firm observe such behavior through 7 Other studies on CEO connectedness with either other firms or with members of its own board on CEO compensation are Engelberg, Gao, and Parson (2009), Horton, Millo, and Serafeim (2009), and Larcker et al. (2007).”
Business Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry (2009, unknown): “Networks have also been proposed to be channels for inefficient favoritism, as in Hallock (1997), Larcker et al. (2005), and Barnea and Guedj (2007) who study the role of connections of corporate executives and directors in decisions such as the setting of CEO pay.”