Preferences for One-Shot Resolution of Uncertainty and Allais-Type Behavior

136 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Citations in the corpus

Cautious Expected Utility and the Certainty Effect (2015, unknown): “Dillenberger (2010) shows that in the context of recursive and time-neutral, non-Expected Utility preferences over compound lotteries, NCI is equivalent to an intrinsic aversion to receiving partial information – a property which he termed preferences for one-shot resolution of uncertainty.”
Suspense and Surprise (2015, unknown): “More recently, Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) and Dillenberger (2010) model agents who prefer one-shot rather than gradual revelation of information.”
Information Gaps: A Theory of Preferences Regarding the Presence and Absence of Information (2018, background): “…of this information would be the difference between the utility of the compound lottery and the utility of the original prospect, and for nonexpected-utility theories, this value could be negative (Andries & Haddad, 2015; Dillenberger, 2010; Grant et al., 1998; Kreps & Porteus, 1978; Wakker, 1988).”
The Demand for, and Avoidance of, Information (2015, unknown): “Previous treatments of information avoidance in economics have generally derived information-avoidance from risk preferences (e.g., Kreps and Porteus, 1978; Wakker, 1988; Grant et al., 1998; Dillenberger, 2010) or disappointment aversion (e.g., Köszegi, 2006; Karlsson et al., 2009; Köszegi, 2010).”