Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful

By Michael Keen. National tax journal, 2001

266 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/824adbda658c375cc9f1618d195c41e969df0731

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Citations in the corpus

Intellectual property box regimes: effective tax rates and tax policy considerations (2013, background): “The theoretical literature highlights that preferential rates can actually increase overall revenue by effectively isolating tax competition with respect to a mobile tax base (Keen (2001)).”
Firms' Financial Choices and Thin Capitalization Rules under Corporate Tax Competition (2012, background): “Second, our analysis also relates to the theoretical literature that investigates whether the abolition of tax preferences for mobile tax bases raises or reduces tax revenues and welfare in the competing countries (Janeba and Peters, 1999; Keen, 2001; Janeba and Smart, 2003; Haupt and Peters, 2005; ”
Causes, benefits, and risks of business tax incentives (2010, background): “…in the tax bases,13 but more complex tax systems, such as those with tax incentives are typically not considered, but there are a few exceptions: Keen (2002) considers tax competition in the presence of special regimes and argues that targeting reduced tax rates at the most mobile activities…”
Evaluating State and Local Business Tax Incentives (2020, background): “For a discussion of related considerations regarding international taxation, see Keen (2001); Dharmapala (2008). limited effects for tax exemptions for mobile firms within New York State.”
Tax Competition When Firms Choose Their Organizational Form: Should Tax Loopholes for Multinationals Be Closed? (2005, background): “In contrast, Keen (2001) assumes that both tax bases are internationally mobile to some degree.”
Corporate income tax reforms and international tax competition (2002, unknown): “In this context, ‘special’ regimes could be seen as a further attempt to reduce taxes on specific, targeted, forms of mobile capital, as has been suggested by Keen (2002).”
The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on Multinationals' Financing and Investment Decisions (2006, unknown): “…for tax-planning might result in adverse consequences for the level of investment undertaken by multinationals in high-tax countries which may also reinforce tax-competition (e.g., Keen, 2001, and Peralta, Wauthy, and van Yperserle, 2006, see also Janeba and Smart, 2003, and Panteghini, 2006).”
The impact of thin-capitalization rules on the capital structure of multinational firms (2012, unknown): “…theoretical literature, restricting opportunities for tax planning might result in adverse consequences for multinationals’ investment and reinforce tax competition (Keen, 2001; Janeba and Smart, 2003; Peralta, Wauthy and van Ypersele, 2006; Bucovetsky and Haufler, 2008; Haufler and Runkel, 2008).”
A partial race to the bottom: corporate tax developments in emerging and developing economies (2013, background): “See also Mintz (1990) which develops an effective marginal tax rate taking account of tax holidays. episodes of large changes in effective average and marginal tax rate to better understand the motivation of such changes, as well as to get a preview of their revenue/investment impact (Section III).”
Saving Taxes Through Foreign Plant Ownership (2010, unknown): “…subsidiaries in a given host country, e.g., via reduced statutory tax rates and/or additional tax base allowances (see, e.g., Weichenrieder, 1996b; Keen, 2001; Janeba and Smart, 2003; Haupt and Peters, 2005; Bucovetsky and Haufler, 2006a,b).1 The above-mentioned theoretical literature suggests…”