CacheQuote: Efficiently Recovering Long-term Secrets of SGX EPID via Cache Attacks

By Fergus Dall, Gabrielle De Micheli, Thomas Eisenbarth, Daniel Genkin, Nadia Heninger, Ahmad Moghimi, Yuval Yarom. 2018

93 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) allows users to perform secure computation on platforms that run untrusted software. To validate that the computation is correctly initialized and that it executes on trusted hardware, SGX supports attestation providers that can vouch for the user’s computation. Communication with these attestation providers is based on the Extended Privacy ID (EPID) protocol, which not only validates the computation but is also designed to maintain the user’s privacy. In particular, EPID is designed to ensure that the attestation provider is unable to identify the host on which the computation executes. In this work we investigate the security of the Intel implementation of the EPID protocol. We identify an implementation weakness that leaks information via a cache side channel. We show that a malicious attestation provider can use the leaked information to break the unlinkability guarantees of EPID. We analyze the leaked information using a lattice-based approach for solving the hidden number problem, which we adapt to the zero-knowledge proof in the EPID scheme, extending prior attacks on signature schemes.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems

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Citations in the corpus

Slalom: Fast, Verifiable and Private Execution of Neural Networks in Trusted Hardware (2018, background): “The recent Spectre attacks on speculative execution (Kocher et al., 2018) also prove damaging to SGX (as well as to most other processors), as recently shown (Chen et al., 2018; Dall et al., 2018; Van Bulck et al., 2018).”
Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order Execution (2018, unknown): “This point has been repeatedly demonstrated in the form of a steady stream of highresolution PRIME+PROBE CPU cache [6,12,17,23,46,51] and branch prediction [13, 39] attacks against SGX enclaves.”
Packet Chasing: Spying on Network Packets over a Cache Side-Channel (2019, unknown): “These attacks have the potential to reveal sensitive information such as cryptographic keys [24]–[29], keystrokes [30], [31], and web browsing data [32], [33], by exploiting timing variations that arise as a result of a victim process and a spy process contending for a shared cache.”
Cache Telepathy: Leveraging Shared Resource Attacks to Learn DNN Architectures (2018, background): “Recent works also target application fingerprinting [28, 42, 48, 50, 73] to steal web content or server data, monitor user behavior [22, 36, 46, 71], and break system protection mechanisms such as SGX and KASLR [11, 21, 61].”