Economics of Electric Vehicle Charging: A Game Theoretic Approach

By Wayes Tushar, David B. Smith. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2012

376 citations recorded by the source corpus.

In this paper, the problem of grid-to-vehicle energy exchange between a smart grid and plug-in electric vehicle groups (PEVGs) is studied using a noncooperative Stackelberg game. In this game, on the one hand, the smart grid, which acts as a leader, needs to decide on its price so as to optimize its revenue while ensuring the PEVGs' participation. On the other hand, the PEVGs, which act as followers, need to decide on their charging strategies so as to optimize a tradeoff between the benefit from battery charging and the associated cost. Using variational inequalities, it is shown that the proposed game possesses a socially optimal Stackelberg equilibrium in which the grid optimizes its price while the PEVGs choose their equilibrium strategies. A distributed algorithm that enables the PEVGs and the smart grid to reach this equilibrium is proposed and assessed by extensive simulations. Further, the model is extended to a time-varying case that can incorporate and handle slowly varying environments.

Subfields: Automotive Engineering, Electrical and Electronic Engineering

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8209d0f61f3d63b98e5ed42043ddc5f67afa0f3f

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In Automotive Engineering

  1. Chau Yuen
  2. H. Vincent Poor
  3. Jun Kyun Choi
  4. Moshe Zukerman
  5. Joohyung Lee
  6. Jun Guo
  7. Wayes Tushar
  8. David B. Smith

In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

  1. Chau Yuen
  2. H. Vincent Poor
  3. Wayes Tushar
  4. Moshe Zukerman
  5. Joohyung Lee
  6. Jun Kyun Choi
  7. Jun Guo
  8. Tapan Kumar Saha

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