Differential Fault Analysis of the Advanced Encryption Standard Using a Single Fault

By Michael Tunstall, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, Subidh Ali. Workshop in Information Security Theory and Practice, 2011

375 citations recorded by the source corpus.

In this paper we present a differential fault attack that can be applied to the AES using a single fault. We demonstrate that when a single random byte fault is induced at the input of the eighth round, the AES key can be deduced using a two stage algorithm. The first step has a statistical expectation of reducing the possible key hypotheses to 232, and the second step to a mere 28.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/81cfccc270902b9cc6e91cb360a168d9fc416e89

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

1. Jo Van Bulck
2. Frank Piessens
3. Daniel Gruss
4. Simha Sethumadhavan
5. Salvatore J. Stolfo
6. Adrian Tang
7. Pavel Laskov
8. Konrad Rieck

In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

1. Frank Piessens
2. Salvatore J. Stolfo
3. Adrian Tang

Citations in the corpus

• Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX (2020, methodology): “[68] as implemented by Jovanovic3: Given a pair of correct and faulty ciphertext on the same plaintext, this attack is able to recover the full 128-bit AES key with a computational complexity of only 2(32)+256 encryptions on average.”
• CLKSCREW: Exposing the Perils of Security-Oblivious Energy Management (2017, background): “Being able to induce a one-byte random corruption to the intermediate state of an AES round is often used as a fault model in several physical fault injection works [18, 56].”