Closer to People and Trees: Will Decentralisation Work for the People and the Forests of Indonesia?

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Can “fragile states” decide to reduce their deforestation? The inappropriate use of the theory of incentives with respect to the REDD mechanism (2012, background): “In Indonesia, after the economic crisis of 1997–98, the postSuharto government, which was worried about national unity, chose to give the provinces and districts considerable autonomy in managing natural resources, and allow them to retain the bulk of the tax revenue (Pradnja-Resosudarmo, 2004).”
Payments for environmental services as an alternative to logging under weak property rights: The case of Indonesia ☆ (2008, background): “Resosudarmo (2004) notes that the Ministry of Forestry estimated the total area of Indonesian forest allocated for small-scale concessions by district governments since the system was established to be in the order of two million hectares in January 2003.”
The poverty of forestry policy: double standards on an uneven playing field (2007, background): “…are retained for central government authorities, while degraded, non-commercial, low-value lands and resources used primarily for subsistence tend to be transferred to local authorities (Ribot 1999b, 2000; Bazaara 2003, 2006; Muhereza 2003; Resosudarmo and Pradnja 2005; Xu and Ribot 2005).”
The context of REDD+ in Indonesia: drivers, agents and institutions. (2012, background): “In the 1990s, the government began a programme on HTIs for pulp and paper (Resosudarmo 2004).”