Relationship Banking, Fragility, and the Asset-Liability Matching Problem

By Fenghua Song, Anjan V. Thakor. 2007

197 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8173985db2027bcb041b1d787a1fa19dfad5728c

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Citations in the corpus

How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises (2013, unknown): “In addition, Song and Thakor (2007) show that banks that make relationship loans prefer to finance with ‘‘stable funds’’ because this increases the likelihood that such loans will not be terminated prematurely.”
Multinational banks and the global financial crisis: Weathering the perfect storm? (2014, background): “See Cerutti et al. (2010) for an analysis of the costs in regards to (partial) ring-fencing of subsidiaries in Emerging Europe and Van Lelyveld and Spaltro (2011) for the cost associated with burden sharing.”
Why do some banks contribute more to global systemic risk? (2018, result): “8 The hypothesis of banks’ non-core activities causing an increase in systemic risk is also in line with the theoretical models of Song and Thakor (2007) and Shleifer and Vishny (2010) and the empirical findings of DeYoung and Torna (in press).”
Bank Activity and Funding Strategies: The Impact on Risk and Return (2009, background): “Therefore, to reduce bank fragility, banks making relationship loans are financed relatively heavily by core deposits, which are unlikely to be withdrawn prematurely since they are held for their liquidity services (Song and Thakor, 2007)4.”
The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation (2018, background): “25Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) and Stulz (2010) find scant evidence that banks use CDS to hedge loans and argue that—while liquid for large corporations—the CDS market is illiquid for the smaller companies that receive a lot of bank loans.”
The Dark Side of Bank Wholesale Funding (2010, background): “2The "sluggishness" of retail deposits is a well-established stylized fact (Feldman and Schmidt, 2001; Song and Thakor, 2007).”
Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital (2016, background): “…destroys some economic value intrinsic to bank Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2838437 10 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND debt (Song and Thakor 2007; DeAngelo and Stulz 2013).4 This reduces the cash investors’ surplus, along with bank profits, and can harm bank borrowers…”
Incentives to Innovate and Financial Crises (2012, background): “…between private and public ownership (e.g. Boot, Gopalan and Thakor, 2006, 2008), the matching of assets and liabilities on bank balance sheets based on value added (e.g. Song and Thakor, 2007), “endogenous” optimism (e.g. Van den Steen, 2004), and the theory of the firm (e.g. Van den Steen, 2010).”
Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis (2011, background): “I want to thank Franklin Allen, Heitor Almeida, Sreedhar Bharath, Charles Calomiris, Sudheer Chava, Douglas Diamond, Gary Fissel, Chris James, Han Kim, Paul Kupiec, Pete Kyle, M.P. Narayanan, Paolo Pasquariello, Raghuram Rajan, Joao Santos, Antoinette Schoar, Amit Seru, Matt Spiegel, Bhaskaran Swami”
Safer Ratios, Riskier Portfolios: Banks’ Response to Government Aid (2014, unknown): “As a proxy for a bank's funding mix, we use the ratio of deposit funding from purchased money to core deposits (Song and Thakor, 2007).”
Small Bank Comparative Advantages in Alleviating Financial Constraints and Providing Liquidity Insurance over Time (2017, background): “Small banks tend to finance their relationship loans with relatively stable core deposits (Song and Thakor, 2007).”
Deposits and Bank Capital Structure (2015, background): “…with a simple model where banks finance themselves with equity capital and (uninsured) deposits and invest in risky assets.4 The providers of equity capital can invest directly in the risky assets, while the providers of deposits only have a storage 3For an exception, see Song and Thakor (2007).”