Information-theoretic security proof for quantum-key-distribution protocols

By Renato Renner, Nicolas Gisin, Barbara Kraus. 2005

454 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We present a technique for proving the security of quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocols. It is based on direct information-theoretic arguments and thus also applies if no equivalent entanglement purification scheme can be found. Using this technique, we investigate a general class of QKD protocols with one-way classical post-processing. We show that, in order to analyze the full security of these protocols, it suffices to consider collective attacks. Indeed, we give new lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate which only involve entropies of two-qubit density operators and which are thus easy to compute. As an illustration of our results, we analyze the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the six-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols with one-way error correction and privacy amplification. Surprisingly, the performance of these protocols is increased if one of the parties adds noise to the measurement data before the error correction. In particular, this additional noise makes the protocols more robust against noise in the quantum channel.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/80ffc4a555f77e2bb66433be6626b3a0e08a713e

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In Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics

Citations in the corpus

Tight finite-key analysis for quantum cryptography (2011, background): “On the theory side, the security of several variants of QKD protocols against general attacks has been proved [3–8].”
Integrated Source of Spectrally Filtered Correlated Photons for Large-Scale Quantum Photonic Systems (2014, background): “[57] R.”
Secure quantum key distribution with realistic devices (2020, background): “There is another line of security analysis (Coles et al., 2017; Renner, 2008; Renner et al., 2005; Scarani and Renner, 2008; Tomamichel et al., 2012) that originates from the communication complexity and quantum memory approach (Ben-Or, 2002; Renner, 2008).”