Private Control Benefits and Earnings Management: Evidence from Insider Controlled Firms

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Drivers behind the monitoring effectiveness of global institutional investors: Evidence from earnings management (2016, unknown): “13 Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) and Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012) that measures the extent to which insiders exercise discretion in reporting earnings.”
Dividend Policy and Earnings Management Across Countries (2017, unknown): “Notably, Lang, Raedy, and Wilson (2006) and Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012) find that firms from countries with weak investor protection manage earnings more aggressively.”
Earnings Management, Capital Structure and the Role of Institutional Environments (2016, background): “Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012) argue that strong investor protection countries can provide higher benefits from reducing information asymmetry in complex ownership structures.”
Real earnings management in family firms: Evidence from an emerging economy (2016, background): “Gopalan and Jayraman (2012) show that earnings management has strong association with private benefit consumptions in relatively weaker investor protection countries.”
Business group affiliation, ownership structure, and the cost of debt (2013, background): “However, as documented by Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012), the role of business groups is distinct from that of ownership concentration or control-ownership divergence.”