Banking panics of the Gilded Age

By E. Wicker. 2000

160 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/801b75191fc2d8cca79d8a67a3098f98f3881453

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. C. Calomiris
2. Amil Dasgupta
3. Marie Hoerova
4. Florian Heider
5. Frédéric Malherbe
6. Ana Babus
7. Xavier Vives
8. Iman van Lelyveld

In Finance

1. Florian Heider
2. Marie Hoerova
3. C. Calomiris
4. Amil Dasgupta
5. Frédéric Malherbe
6. Thorsten Beck
7. Luc Laeven
8. Ana Babus

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Amil Dasgupta
2. C. Calomiris

Citations in the corpus

• Deep Recessions, Fast Recoveries, and Financial Crises: Evidence from the American Record (2012, unknown): “For the post war period, we use the chronology of Lopez-Salido and Nelson.”
• The Panic of 1907 (2012, unknown): “Wicker (2000) proposes that the New York Clearing House and the large, correspondent national bank members had sufficient power to quell financial panics and that the observation of financial panics was an institutional failure.”
• A Theory of Bank Liquidity Requirements (2015, background): “For example, the New York Clearing House maintained a 25% cash reserve requirement against deposits for its members.1 In the famous 1873 Coe Report, authored by George Coe, the President of the New York Clearing House, cash was seen as the essential tool for managing systemic risk (Wicker 2000).”
• Has the Fed Been a Failure (2012, unknown): “Jali‘s findings agree with Elmus Wicker‘s conclusion, based on his comprehensive analyses of financial crises between the Civil War and World War II (Wicker 1996, 2000), that previous assessments had exaggerated the frequency of pre-Fed banking panics by 25 In particular, the 1930s Fed has been…”
• FINANCIAL CONTAGION THROUGH CAPITAL CONNECTIONS: A MODEL OF THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF BANK PANICS (2004, background): “The work of Calomiris and Gorton (1991), Wicker (2000) and others indicate that the panics typically began with local shocks to assets in New York.”
• U.S. Stock Market Crashes and Their Aftermath: Implications for Monetary Policy (2002, unknown): “A nationwide suspension of specie payments to depositors quelled the panic and payments were not resumed until January 1908 (Sprague, 1910 and Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, Mishkin, 1991, Wicker, 2000).”