The One-More-RSA-Inversion Problems and the Security of Chaum's Blind Signature Scheme
By Mihir Bellare, Chanathip Namprempre, David Pointcheval, Michael Semanko. Journal of Cryptology, 2003
399 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7f93af470a8a92293db7c6fb582a5cc6300338b8
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Jonathan Katz
- David E. Evans
- Dan Boneh
- Brent Waters
- Jens Groth
- Mihir Bellare
- Emiliano De Cristofaro
- Gregory Neven
In Information Systems
- Jonathan Katz
- Jens Groth
- David E. Evans
- Emiliano De Cristofaro
- Gene Tsudik
- Mihir Bellare
- Gregory Neven
- Adriana Palacio
Citations in the corpus
- DupLESS: Server-Aided Encryption for Deduplicated Storage (2013, methodology): “In Section 4, we propose a new server-aided MLE scheme DupLESSMLE which combines a CE-type base with the OPRF protocol based on RSA blind-signatures [20] [29] [30].”
- Private Set Intersection: Are Garbled Circuits Better than Custom Protocols? (2012, methodology): “Security of their protocols is based on the (non-standard) one-morediscrete-logarithm or one-more-RSA assumptions [4] in the random oracle model.”
- Structure-Preserving Signatures and Commitments to Group Elements (2010, methodology): “A classical way of realizing efficient instantiations is to rely on the randomoracle heuristic [BR93] for non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs—or to directly use interactive assumptions (like the LRSW assumption [LRSW00] and its variants, or “one-more” assumptions [ BNPS03 ]).”
- Practical Private Set Intersection Protocols with Linear Complexity (2010, methodology): “Our proof works in the random oracle model (ROM) under the RSA assumption.”
- GQ and Schnorr Identification Schemes: Proofs of Security against Impersonation under Active and Concurrent Attacks (2002, methodology): “We recall the notion of security under one more inversion (omi) [5].”
- Security Proofs for Identity-Based Identification and Signature Schemes (2008, background): “Security of schemes is based on either the one-wayness of the RSA function associated with the key generator or on the hardness of the so-called one-more RSA inversion problem [8].”
- Fast and Private Computation of Cardinality of Set Intersection and Union (2012, background): “They replace OPRFs with unpredictable functions [27] and blind signatures [12], with security under One-More-DH and One-More-RSA assumptions [5], respectively.”
- Do I know you?: efficient and privacy-preserving common friend-finder protocols and applications (2013, methodology): “To the best of our knowledge, the most ef.cient PSI-CA protocol is presented in [14], with honest-but-curious security in ROM, under the OneMore-DH assumption [8].”
- Compact Multi-Signatures for Smaller Blockchains (2018, background): “Their signing protocol requires two rounds of communication among the signing parties, and they prove security of their scheme assuming the one-more discrete-log assumption (as assumption introduced in [8]).”