Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices

By Nadia Heninger, Zakir Durumeric, Eric Wustrow, Alex Halderman. USENIX Security Symposium, 2012

477 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7e219f166318ccbc007d2fb929a6178f67cf5579

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Citations in the corpus

Measuring the Longitudinal Evolution of the Online Anonymous Marketplace Ecosystem (2015, unknown): “[20] and Lenstra et al.”
Quantum random number generators (2016, background): “…of vulnerabilities due to initialization problems or other bad quality random number generators are weak RSA key generation in network devices (Heninger et al., 2012; Lenstra et al., 2012), repeated or guessable keys produced inside smart cards (Bernstein et al., 2013; Courtois et al., 2013;…”
Advances in quantum cryptography (2019, unknown): “In general, problems can arise whenever something that is assumed to be chosen randomly is in fact not [702].”
Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Practice (2014, background): “We were unable to easily give an explanation for most of the repeated keys, as (unlike in the results reported in [28]) many of the clusters of repeated keys appeared to have almost nothing in common: different SSH versions and operating systems, different ports open, different results using nmap ho”
Analysis of the HTTPS certificate ecosystem (2013, methodology): “Scan EFF [14] Ps & Qs [16] First Representative Latest Total Date Completed 2010-8 2011-10 2012-6-10 2013-3-22 2013-8-4 Unique”
Towards Automated Dynamic Analysis for Linux-based Embedded Firmware (2016, background): “[14] showed that embedded devices can also suffer from entropy problems.”
A Search Engine Backed by Internet-Wide Scanning (2015, background): “There have been a large number of research studies over the past several years that have been based on Internet-wide scanning [1, 7–11,13,14,18,19,24–29,38], which encouraged us to develop Censys.”
Blockwise p-Tampering Attacks on Cryptographic Primitives, Extractors, and Learners (2017, background): “, during the boot time [30], and is also made available to the algorithms requesting them in blocks.”