Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences
By Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan. Journal of Political Economy, 2003
3,473 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Much of our understanding of corporations builds on the idea that managers, when they are not closely monitored, will pursue goals that are not in shareholders’ interests. But what goals would managers pursue? This paper uses variation in corporate governance generated by state adoption of antitakeover laws to empirically map out managerial preferences. We use plant‐level data and exploit a unique feature of corporate law that allows us to deal with possible biases associated with the timing of the laws. We find that when managers are insulated from takeovers, worker wages (especially those of white‐collar workers) rise. The destruction of old plants falls, but the creation of new plants also falls. Finally, overall productivity and profitability decline in response to these laws. Our results suggest that active empire building may not be the norm and that managers may instead prefer to enjoy the quiet life.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7dd8d818f8c5a17c5cd8c397e80c33a75ce985af
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In Accounting
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- Chen Lin
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Citations in the corpus
- Financial Reporting Quality and Labor Investment Efficiency (2014, neutral): “, Jensen 1986; Richardson 2006), but can also lead to underinvestment if, for example, managers pass up profitable investment opportunities because they are effort-averse and prefer the “quiet life” (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003).”
- The effect of mandatory CSR disclosure on firm profitability and social externalities: Evidence from China (2017, positive): “In our first test, we replace Post with indicator variables that track the effect of the mandatory CSR disclosure before and after it becomes effective, using 2008 as the benchmark year ( Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003 ).”
- Globalization and the Provision of Incentives inside the Firm: The Effect of Foreign Competition (2009, neutral): “[10] Bertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan.”
- Privatization and the Decline of Labour's Share: International Evidence from Network Industries (2012, neutral): “For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) find that weak corporate governance prompted by state laws o§ering protection against hostile takeovers tends to increase the labour share (though more through an e§ect on wages than employment).”
- Corporate Governance, Norms and Practices (2009, positive): “Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), we perform these regressions not only for the whole sample but also for oil price sensitive industries, using the oil price as instrument for Tobin’s Q to capture the independent effect of Tobin’s Q on governance scores.”
- Does managerial ability facilitate corporate innovative success (2015, neutral): “documented by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), diminishes some of the benefits of managerial ability in long-serving CEO‟s.”
- The Sources of Value Destruction in Acquisitions by Entrenched Managers (2012, positive): “These results are broadly consistent with the Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) quiet-life hypothesis, characterizing part of the agency problem as a desire by entrenched managers to maintain their position of freedom from interference.”
- Research and Development, Cash Flow, Agency and Governance: UK large companies (2012, background): “First, the United States, having flirted with a system that permitted easy hostile takeover in the 1980s recast that approach that by permitting takeover defences in most states from the end of that decade ( Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Tylecote and Visintin 2008).”
- Competition and the Cost of Debt (2012, neutral): “23 This specification is essentially a difference-in-differences approach along the lines of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). P. Valta / Journal of Financial Economics 105 (2012) 661–682 673”