Cognitive Foundations of Natural History: Towards an Anthropology of Science.

By G. Nelson. 1994

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF OBJECT CATEGORIZATION IN YOUNG CHILDREN: HIERARCHICAL INCLUSIVENESS, AGE, PERCEPTUAL ATTRIBUTE, AND GROUP VERSUS INDIVIDUAL ANALYSES (2010, background): “Atran, S. (1990). Cognitive foundations of natural history: Towards an anthropology of science. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Baldwin, D. A., Markman, E. M., & Melartin, E. M. (1993). Infants’ ability to draw inferences about nonobvious object properties: Evidence from exploratory play. ”
A theory of causal learning in children: causal maps and Bayes nets. (2004, background): “…from other hypotheses about causal learning in children. is possible that young children do not learn genuinely new causal relations but initially rely on a few innate domain-specific causal schemas that are later enriched (see, e.g., Atran, 1990; Leslie & Roth, 1993; Spelke et al., 1992).”
Conceptual Change and Evolutionary Biology: A Developmental Analysis (2008, background): “Such defi nitions are similar to the generic-species concepts found historically folk beliefs and in traditional societies across the world (Atran, 1990, 1999).”
When Traditional Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds (2007, background): “Historians of biology have recently shown convincingly that this canonical view of the so-called history of essentialism is a contentious construction and is mistaken in significant ways (Amundson 2005; Atran 1990; Camardi 2001; McOuat 1996; Müller-Wille 1999, 2003; Rupke 1993; Stevens 1984, 1994, 1”
The science of religious beliefs (2008, background): “Cross-cultural research has shown that the factors that we non-reflectively believe to be most important include general physical morphology, size, and environmental niche (Atran, 1990, 1995).”
The Theory Theory as an Alternative to the Innateness Hypothesis (2008, background): “It has dominated Chomsky’s own field, syntax, and has influenced theories of semantics (Pinker, 1989), and phonology (Eimas, 1975), and of our knowledge of everyday physics (Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, and Jacobson, 1992), biology (Atran, 1990), psychology (Leslie & Roth, 1993), and even ethics (”
On a Folk Theory of Society: Children, Evolution, and Mental Representations of Social Groups (2001, background): “Both adults and children, by construing species as things-typically constituted through attribution of a common species essence shared by each individual token of the species type-afford precisely this sort of inferential potential (for adults see Atran, 1990; for children see Gelman, 1988).”
FOLKBIOLOGY DOESN'T COME FROM FOLKPSYCHOLOGY: EVIDENCE FROM YUKATEK MAYA IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (2001, background): “The competing paradigm of an autonomous folkbiology relies to a greater extent on cross-cultural research (Atran 1990; Lopez et al. 1997; see also Berlin et al. 1973; Hunn 1977; Hays 1983, Brown 1984, Berlin 1992).”
Geographical categories: an ontological investigation (2001, methodology): “It is these empirical methods which have been applied, in the studies of Keil (1979, 1987, 1989, 1994), Medin (Murphy and Medin 1985, Medin and Atran, 1999), Atran (1994). and others, to the task of eliciting the folk ontologies of na ̈ve subjects in such areas as folk physics, folk biology and folk”
The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents (2005, background): “In addition to the evidence for cognitive uniformity from developmental psychology, there is increasing evidence in similar vein from anthropological investigation (Atran, 1990, 2002; Boyer, 1994; Brown, 1991; Sperber, 1996).”
The role of attraction in cultural evolution (2007, background): “Two naturalistic research programmes relevant to the explanation of cultural phenomena that started in the 70s – the evolutionary approach of Boyd and Richerson (1985, Richerson and Boyd 2005), and their collaborators, and the cognitive approach of Atran (1990, 2002), Boyer (1994, 2001), Hirschfeld ”
Culture and Cognition (2019, unknown): “Despite such heterogeneity, across cultures, people classify animals and plants in a similar way (Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1973; Berlin, 1992; Atran, 1990, 1998; Medin & Atran, 2004; Medin et al. 2007).”
Detecting blickets: how young children use information about novel causal powers in categorization and induction. (2000, background): “However, it is possible that the causal entities and laws of everyday physics, biology, and psychology are innately specified (see, e.g., Atran, 1990; Leslie & Roth, 1993), rather than learned.”
The vernacular concept of innateness (2009, background): “to possess kind-typical properties (Medin and Ortony, 1989; Atran, 1990; Gelman, 2003).”