Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution.

By Hoi-Kwong Lo, Marcos Curty, Bing Qi. Physical Review Letters, 2011

1,781 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How to remove detector side channel attacks has been a notoriously hard problem in quantum cryptography. Here, we propose a simple solution to this problem--measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (QKD). It not only removes all detector side channels, but also doubles the secure distance with conventional lasers. Our proposal can be implemented with standard optical components with low detection efficiency and highly lossy channels. In contrast to the previous solution of full device independent QKD, the realization of our idea does not require detectors of near unity detection efficiency in combination with a qubit amplifier (based on teleportation) or a quantum nondemolition measurement of the number of photons in a pulse. Furthermore, its key generation rate is many orders of magnitude higher than that based on full device independent QKD. The results show that long-distance quantum cryptography over say 200 km will remain secure even with seriously flawed detectors.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7bc788574d753bc54aae51111256402636eb4a9d

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Citations in the corpus

Distributing Secret Keys with Quantum Continuous Variables: Principle, Security and Implementations (2015, background): “…(MDI) QKD, is available and offers protection against all side-channel attacks targeting the detectors of the QKD implementation; [87] considered an MDI-QKD protocol using weak coherent pulses and decoy states, while [88] considered a MDI-QKD protocol in the entanglement-based…”
Superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors for quantum information (2020, background): “protocols were proposed and demonstrated to make QKD more practical and powerful against various possible attacks, including decoy-state QKD [45, 46, 47], measurement device-independent QKD (MDI–QKD) [48], and the latest two-field QKD (TF–QKD) [49]. For obtaining the details of quantum cryptography,”
High-rate measurement-device-independent quantum cryptography (2013, background): “[12] in the speciﬁc context of qubits (weak pulses and decoy states), with a series of further investigations [14–22].”
Chip-based quantum key distribution (2015, methodology): “These devices could be readily adapted to implement more protocols, such as the reference-frame independent and measurement-device independent QKD protocols [27, 28].”
Fundamental limits of repeaterless quantum communications (2015, neutral): “check that the optimum is given by µ= 1 and the maximum key rate becomes RBB84-decoy = η/(2e). Finally consider DV-MDI-QKD. The general expression of the key rate is given by the following expression [S54] R= P11 Z Y 11 Z 1− H2(e11 Z ) −G δ(Q ), (S244) where P11 Z = µAµB exp[−(µA +µB)] is the joint ”
Experimental demonstration of polarization encoding measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution. (2013, methodology): “Recently, measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) has been proposed to close all the security loopholes at the detection devices [16].”
Long-term performance of the SwissQuantum quantum key distribution network in a field environment (2011, background): “ized by the research community since the middle of 2010 [30, 31]. The goal of quantum hacking is to show loopholes in given QKD implementations, and to propose countermeasures against those loopholes [32, 33, 34, 35]. The SwissQuantum projectstartedbefore2010,i.e. beforethatquantumhackingbecameanimp”
Practical challenges in quantum key distribution (2016, neutral): “As another example, the need to counter detector side-channel attacks has led to the discovery of measurement device independent (MDI) QKD. 21 New theory that is due to practical advances in QKD also includes, for instance, the quantum de Finetti theorem, 22 while security loopholes in QKD are…”