Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for Ethics*
By Joshua D. Greene. Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy, 2014
330 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Information Systems and Management, Social Psychology
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7bc1290afb44c0b6e9197c0f4913aaef89e4e30f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Laura A. Creighton
- Iyad Rahwan
- Azim Shariff
- Jean‐François Bonnefon
- Bertram Gawronski
- Galen Bodenhausen
- Lisa Feldman Barrett
- J. de Houwer
In Information Systems and Management
In Social Psychology
- Laura A. Creighton
- Iyad Rahwan
- Azim Shariff
- Jean‐François Bonnefon
- Bertram Gawronski
- Galen Bodenhausen
- J. de Houwer
- Nilanjana Dasgupta
Citations in the corpus
- Autonomous Vehicles Need Experimental Ethics: Are We Ready for Utilitarian Cars? (2015, methodology): “Trolley problems inspired a huge number of experiments, aimed at identifying both the antecedents and the cognitive processing leading to a utilitarian decision [Greene, 2014c, Greene, 2014b].”
- Dual Process Th eories (2013, background): “To study the processes underlying responses to moral dilemmas (see Greene, 2008, 2014), Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf, and Hütter (2017) developed a multi-process model that quantifies the contribution of three distinct factors: (1) sensitivity to consequences, (2) sensitivity to moral…”
- The social dilemma of autonomous vehicles (2015, methodology): “c exposure and a disproportionate weight in individual and public decisions about AVs. We suggest that a way out of this conundrum is to adopt a data-driven approach, inspired by experimental ethics [Greene, 2014a], to identify moral algorithms that people are willing to accept as citizens and to be”
- How foreign language shapes moral judgment (2015, unknown): “2 We follow Greene (2014) in using deontological and utilitarian to mean respectively "characteristically deontological" and "characteristically utilitarian" as a function of the response content, not the underlying motivation.”