The Security of the Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code

By Mihir Bellare, Joe Kilian, Phillip Rogaway. Journal of computer and system sciences (Print), 2000

684 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7a7a794baaa5567a04e15f760da3d2d3b2b25ef8

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Citations in the corpus

Authenticated-encryption with associated-data (2002, background): “Pseudorandom function originate with [10]; our treatment is a concrete-security one that follows [2].”
Lecture Notes on Cryptography (2001, background): “7 are from [13], as are Propositions 5.”
Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC (2004, methodology): “We review the standard definitions for blockciphers and their security [2] and the extension of these notions to tweakable blockciphers [12] blockciphers and tweakable blockciphers we call n the blocksize and we call K the key space.”
The Security and Performance of the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of Operation (2004, methodology): “In our analysis, we make use of the well-known result on the use of a PRP as a PRF [3].”
Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange in the Three-Party Setting (2005, background): “The security notion that we need for the MAC scheme is strong existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks, which is based on existential unforgeability notion in [6].”
A Block-Cipher Mode of Operation for Parallelizable Message Authentication (2002, background): “It is a standard result that being secure in the sense of a PRF implies an inability to forge with good probability. See [ 4 , 15].”
A pairwise key predistribution scheme for wireless sensor networks (2005, background): “(This de.nition is a straightforward lifting of the standard notion of security for message authentication [Bellare et al. 2000] to the multiparty setting.)”
Tweakable Block Ciphers (2002, background): “[3] show that if A is an adversary that aims to distinguish a CBC MAC oracle from a random oracle, an adversary A′ can be constructed that aims to distinguish the block cipher from a random permutation, such that”
The Galois/Counter Mode of Operation (GCM) (2005, background): “GCM is secure in the concrete security models introduced by Bellare, Killian, and Rogaway [20] for message authentication, and Bellare, Desai, Jokipii, and Rogaway for confidentiality [22], against adversaries that can adaptively choose the plaintext, the additional associated data, and the IV (as l”
Practical techniques for searches on encrypted data (2000, methodology): “For instance, given any block cipher, we may build a pseudorandom generator us-ing the counter mode [3] or a pseudorandom function using the CBC-MAC [4].”
Introduction to Modern Cryptography, Second Edition (2014, neutral): “[18] from the definition of security for digital signatures given by Goldwasser et al.”
Breaking Symmetric Cryptosystems Using Quantum Period Finding (2016, methodology): “basic CBC-MAC is only secure when the queries are preﬁx-free, there are many variants of CBC-MAC to provide security for arbitrary messages. In the following we describe the Encrypted-CBC-MAC variant [5], using two keys k and k′, but the attack can be easily adapted to other variants[8,26,21]. On a ”
OMAC: One-Key CBC MAC (2003, methodology): “Algorithm OMAC-familyK(M) L← EK(Cst) Y [0] ← 0 Partition M into M [1] · · ·M [m] for i← 1 to m− 1 do X[i]←M [i] ⊕ Y [i− 1] Y [i]← EK(X[i]) X[m]← padn(M [m])⊕ Y [m− 1] if |M [m]| = n then X[m]← X[m]⊕HL(Cst1) else X[m]← X[m] ⊕HL(Cst2) T ← EK(X[m]) return T”