VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF ACCOUNTING RATIOS IN THE UK

By Anna Watson, Philip J. Shrives, Claire Marston. 2002

580 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7a3eed7faec8b482bb87a21386cfaf7807248765

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Citations in the corpus

The extent of voluntary disclosure and its determinants in emerging markets: Evidence from Egypt (2017, background): “Agency theory assumes that companies resort to disclose extra information voluntarily to decrease the agency costs that arise from contest between managers and shareholders (Alves et al., 2012; Zayoud et al., 2011; Watson et al., 2002; and Lambert, 2001) .”
Theories and Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure (2014, background): “In addition, voluntary disclosure is another means of mitigating the agency problem, where managers disclose more voluntary information reducing the agency costs (Barako et al., 2006) and also to convince the external users that managers are acting in an optimal way (Watson et al., 2002).”
The determinants of corporate disclosure: a meta-analysis (2010, background): “For large firms listed on stock exchanges, continued access to direct financing is, as argued by Watson et al. (2002)”
Intellectual capital disclosure, cost of finance and firm value (2009, background): “Leverage could have a positive association (due to higher agency costs) as well as a negative association (due to a lack of financial resources to cover reporting costs) with the extent of IC disclosure (Inchausti, 1997; Watson et al., 2002; Cormier and Magnan, 2003).”
Determinants of CSR disclosure quantity and quality: Evidence from non-financial listed firms in Saudi Arabia (2016, background): “In addition, CSR disclosure is another means of mitigating the agency problem, where managers disclose more CSR information to reduce the agency costs (Barako et al, 2006), as well as to convince the external users that managers are acting in an optimal way (Watson et al , 2002).”
What explains variation in voluntary disclosure? A study of the annual reports of corporations listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (2010, background): “Choi 1973; Hussein 1996; Zarzeski 1996; Watson et al. 2002; Hope 2003; Emmanuel and Garrod 2004; O’Sullivan et al. 2008).”
Association between firm characteristics and corporate voluntary disclosure: evidence from Turkish listed companies (2013, methodology): “Thus, managers are expected to disclose more information to reduce agency costs (Hossain et al., 1995; Watson et al., 2002; Marston, 2003; Oyelere et al., 2003; Marston & Polei, 2004; Barako, Hancock & Izan, 2006; Hassan, Giorgioni, Romilly & Power, 2009).”
Aggregated, Voluntary and Mandatory Risk Disclosure Incentives: Evidence from UK FTSE All Share Companies (2013, background): “Incentive theories for voluntary risk disclosures include agency theory (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Abraham and Cox, 2007) and signalling theory (e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Watson et al., 2002).”