Vetoing Co-operation: The Impact of Veto Players on Preferential Trading Arrangements

By Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, Jon C. W. Pevehouse. British Journal of Political Science, 2007

150 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/799232f569899e69e794e8a3b6380d39a8ca889a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Development

1. Edward D. Mansfield
2. Jon C. W. Pevehouse
3. Helen V. Milner
4. Leonardo Baccini
5. Manfred Elsig
6. Andreas Dür
7. Simone Dietrich
8. S. Baier

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Leonardo Baccini
2. Andreas Dür
3. Jon C. W. Pevehouse
4. Manfred Elsig
5. Edward D. Mansfield
6. Helen V. Milner
7. E. Reinhardt
8. S. Baier

In Finance

1. Leonardo Baccini
2. Andreas Dür
3. Edward D. Mansfield
4. Helen V. Milner
5. Manfred Elsig

Citations in the corpus

• The design of international trade agreements: Introducing a new dataset (2013, background): “…investments, or forum-shopping as a result of lack of progress in multilateralism (see for example B¨uthe and Milner 2008; Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2012; Maggi and Rodr´ıguez-Clare 2007; Mansfield and Milner 2012; Mansfield et al. 2002, 2007; Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003).”
• Democracy, Veto Players and the Depth of Regional Integration (2008, background): “Others have shown that veto players can affect whether countries liberalise their trade regime or sign RIAs (Frye and Mansfield, 2003; Henisz and Mansfield, 2006; Mansfield et al., 2007).”