Monitoring Job Offer Decisions, Punishments, Exit to Work, and Job Quality
By Gerard J. van den Berg, Johan Vikström. Social Science Research Network, 2014
155 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Unemployment insurance systems include the monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the causal effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wages and occupational level. We use Swedish data and estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We also develop a theoretical job search model that monitors job offer rejection versus job search effort. The empirical results show that, after a sanction, the wage rate is lower and individuals move more often to a part-time job and a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Health Professions
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/793758ce6826097409eb4d99d027c30bfea6e229
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Bruno Crépon
- Gerard J. van den Berg
- Jochen Kluve
- Ralf Andreas Wilke
- J. Abbring
- M. Rosholm
- Bernd Fitzenberger
- Marco Caliendo
In General Health Professions
Citations in the corpus
- Active Labor Market Policies (2016, background): “Displaced workers may have an unrealistically rosy view of their chances in the labor market, and a signal about their actual chances may act as a wake-up call for them to reconsider their search strategy (see, e.g., Van den Berg & Vikström 2014).”