Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities

By David Newbery. 2000

648 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Theory and Application of Linear Supply Function Equilibrium in Electricity Markets (2004, background): “When NP and PG were first created in 1989, NP had 29,486 MW and PG had 19,802 MW (Newbery, 1999, p.202).”
Regulation and Investment in Network Industries: Evidence from European Telecoms (2012, background): “…for comments, as well as seminar participants at Pompeu Fabra University, Tilburg University, the International Industrial Organization Conference in Washington, D.C. (May 16–18, 2008), and the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics Conference in Toulouse (September 4–6, 2008).”
The Impact of Regulation on Cost Efficiency: An Empirical Analysis of Wisconsin Water Utilities (2005, background): “tives resulting from standard rate-of-return regulation, compared to price-cap regulation, is mentioned in manly reference books on regulation (see e.g., Laffont and Tiróle, 1993; Newbery, 1999).”
PWP-078 Linear Supply Function Equilibrium: Generalizations, Application, and Limitations (2000, background): “When NP and PG were first created in 1989, NP had 29,486 MW and PG had 19,802 MW (Newbery, 1999, p.202).”
BENCHMARKING AND REGULATION OF ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION UTILITIES: LESSONS FROM INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE (2001, neutral): “A related aspect of regulatory reform is that of regulatory governance which emphasises the formal status of the regulator and rules of conduct in carrying out their duties and exercising power (see ACCC, 1999; Newbery, 1999; Stern and Holder, 1999; Levy and Spiller, 1994; Berg and Jeong, 1991).”
Why Do States Adopt Renewable Portfolio Standards?: An Empirical Investigation (2010, background): “…enormous, and includes branches focused on describing the economic effects of regulation (Averch and Johnson 1962, Joskow and Rose 1988, Crew 1999, Gilbert and Kahn 1996, Newbery 2000), and on designing optimal regulatory institutions (Laffont and Tirole 1993, Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers 1994).”
Governance Failure: Rethinking the Institutional Dimensions of Urban Water Supply to Poor Households (2008, background): “An important dimension of this debate has been the question of the relative importance of ownership versus institutions 4 in influencing the performance of water supply utilities, and network utilities more generally (e.g., Newbery, 2000).”
Electricity Market Reform in the European Union: Review of Progress toward Liberalization &Integration* (2005, background): “However, there is significant evidence that privatisation does deliver benefits, especially when combined with effective restructuring, competition, and regulation (Newbery, 1999; 2002a).”
Promoting renewable electricity generation in imperfect markets: Price vs. quantity policies (2008, neutral): “Limited price competition may be the result of collusion (Newbery, 2002), a variant of which is to stick to Cournot strategies.”
Electricity market reform failures: UK, Norway, Alberta and California (2003, background): “(c) T&D services that remain regulated and are made available to all users under mandatory open access.”
Regulation, Competition and Liberalization (2005, background): “We are grateful to Sanford Berg, Severin Borenstein, Cory Davidson, Roger Gordon, Antonio Estache, Jerry Hausman, Mark Jamison, Paul Joskow, Mircea Marcu, John McMillan, Paul Sotkiewicz, John Vickers, Catherine Waddams, Helen Weeds, and anonymous referees for helpful comments and observations.”
Demise of the standard model for power sector reform and the emergence of hybrid power markets (2008, background): “That is, one firm was thought to produce goods less expensively than if there were multiple firms in the market, as average costs declined as output increased (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983, pp. 29–20; Newbery, 2001a, pp. 1–2).”