Prominence and Consumer Search
By Mark Armstrong, John Vickers, Jidong Zhou. 2009
339 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7860f6484d331aa05fa1a829bdae8ce1b5364ed1
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Yiquan Gu
- Tobias Wenzel
- Justus Haucap
- Ulrich Heimeshoff
- Jens Suedekum
- Hanna Hottenrott
- Ralf Dewenter
- D. Jovanović
In Marketing
- Yiquan Gu
- Tobias Wenzel
- Justus Haucap
- Ulrich Heimeshoff
- Jens Suedekum
- Hanna Hottenrott
- Ralf Dewenter
- D. Jovanović
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- Paying for Prominence (2011, neutral): “20By contrast, in Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) where price information is imperfect, the direction of causality is reversed, and a rm which happens to be prominent will then choose to o¤er a lower price than its rivals. lead to an easily tractable solution for how rms choose prices on a…”
- Strategic Obfuscation and Consumer Protection Policy (2014, positive): “In the context of search markets, Armstrong et al. (2009a) and Arm-strong (2012) argue that certain consumer protection policies such as limiting maximum prices can backfire and lead firms to raise their average prices.”