Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms in Latin America: A THEORY OF UNION-GOVERNMENT INTERACTIONS

By M. V. Murillo. 2001

315 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Neoliberalism and Democracy in Latin America: A Mixed Record (2004, background): “These draconian measures created tremendous short-term costs for influential, well-organized sectors of business and labor (see Haggard and Kaufman 1995, parts 2-3; Murillo 2001; Stokes 2001a; Teichman 2001; Corrales 2002; Weyland 2002).”
Market Reform, Programmatic (De)alignment, and Party System Stability in Latin America (2013, background): “…labor had a comparative advantage in the reform process: They could offer inducements for cooperation, co-opt union leaders, and draw on reservoirs of political capital and trust to contain popular mobilization, at least in the short term (see Burgess, 2004; Levitsky, 2003; Murillo, 2001).”
Politics and Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean (2006, background): “Finally, the party affiliation and orientation of policymakers have been shown to affect policy (Murillo 2001, 2002).”
Labor Unions, Political Representation, and Economic Inequality (2017, background): “But this protest may serve to undermine the union movement by showing politicians that the movement is divided and weak (Murillo 2001).”
Beyond the Machine (2015, background): “Studies of labor corporatism document a similar tension in which union leaders balance the economic interests of their base against the electoral interests and co-optative pressures of their party allies (Burgess, 2004; R. B. Collier & D. Collier, 1979; Murillo, 2001; Schmitter, 1974).”
The Worldwide Diffusion of Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reform, 1977–1999 (2005, methodology): “The arguments tend to borrow heavily from political economy, and they highlight country-level characteristics that alter policymakers’perceived costs and benefits of such reform (Hallerberg and Basinger 1998; Murillo 2001, 2002).”
Qualitative comparative analysis vis-à-vis regression (2005, background): “For example, scholars have been particularly fascinated by the political situation in Argentina in the 1990s, where a political party with strong ties to a powerful labor union movement instituted radical marketizing reforms (Levitsky and Way, 1998; Murillo, 2001; Stokes, 2001; Levitsky, 2003).”
Response to Seth E. Masket's review of Party Brands in Crisis: Partisanship, Brand Dilution, and the Breakdown of Political Parties in Latin America (2014, background): “20 murillo 2001. often target many voters who already identify with the party.21 and patterns of partisanship across latin america suggest clientelism is not the basis for most voters’ attachments to parties.22 moreover, clientelism alone, or the lack of it, is unlikely to account for the massive…”