Insurer pricing and consumer welfare: evidence from Medigap

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Perfect Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection (2017, methodology): “Indeed, market power is often an issue in these markets (see Dafny (2010), Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanarayanan (2012), and Starc (2014)).”
Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data (2012, background): “For example,Starc (2011) discusses how,when firms have market power,moving from symmetric information to asymmetric information can improve consumer welfare.”
Who benefits when the government pays more? Pass-through in the Medicare Advantage program (2016, unknown): “…in spirit to a number of papers that evaluate the impact of the Medicare program on private insurers and consumers (see Cabral and Mahoney 2013 and Starc 2014 on Medigap, Abaluck and Gruber 2011, Ketcham et al. 2012, Kling et al. 2012, or Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf 2013 on demand in…”
Imperfect Competition in Selection Markets (2017, background): “Perhaps because of this, existing work on imperfect competition has relied more heavily on structural assumptions about firm and consumer behavior (e.g., Starc, 2014).”
Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets (2018, unknown): “Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), we assume that the informational asymmetry in this market concerns the riskiness of the firm. Specifically, conditional on observables, a firm’s riskiness is known by that firm but not by any of the Jmt banks in its market; instead, banks are assumed to know the ”