Interest on Reserves and Monetary Policy. (Session 1: The Reserves Market)

By Marvin Goodfriend. 2002

149 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

The Central-Bank Balance Sheet as an Instrument of Monetary Policy (2011, unknown): “Apart from the efficiency gains modeled here, such a system should also help to facilitate the central bank’s control of the policy rate (Goodfriend, 2002; Woodford, 2003, chap.”
Implementation of Monetary Policy: How Do Central Banks Set Interest Rates? (2010, background): “88For analyses along these lines, see Goodfriend (2002) and Keister et al. (2008).”
The euro area interbank market and the liquidity management of the eurosystem in the financial crisis (2010, background): “Some authors argue that even in normal times excess reserves (i.e. in the euro area amounts held in the deposit facility) should be remunerated at the policy rate so that the opportunity costs of holding reserves are equal to zero, see, for example, Goodfriend (2002) and Borio and Disyatat (2009).”
The Optimal Conduct of Monetary Policy with Interest on Reserves (2012, background): “The basic logic—as articulated by Goodfriend (2002); Keister, Martin, and McAndrews (2008); and Curdia and Woodford (2011)—is an application of the so-called “Friedman rule” (Friedman 1959, 1969): to the extent that central-bank reserves are a valuable transactions medium, they should be made…”
Interbank market liquidity and central bank intervention (2009, background): “Another possibility would be for the central bank to pay banks interest on funds deposited with them as suggested by Goodfriend (2002).”
Do Interbank Customer Relationships Exist? And How Did They Function in the Crisis? Learning from Italy (2012, unknown): “Likewise, Goodfriend (2002) and Martin and McAndrews (2007) claim that banks are not apt to monitor other banks, because the implicit guarantee supplied by central banks, which are expected to intervene in case of crisis, undermines banks’ incentives to monitor their peers.”
Divorcing Money from Monetary Policy (2008, background): “…calls for increasing the supply of reserves enough to ensure that it falls on the flat portion of the demand curve even after this shift is taken into account.16 Goodfriend (2002) takes a different view, proposing that the supply of reserve balances could be used to stabilize financial markets.”
Money and Inflation (2008, unknown): “But movements in money growth tend on average to lead movements in inflation—a regularity noted even in classic contributions on the quantity theory by Hume (1752) and Wicksell (1906/1935), and stressed in the monetarist literature, especially by Milton Friedman from 1970 onward (for example, Friedm”