Corporate Cash Holdings and CEO Compensation Incentives
By Yixin Liu, David C. Mauer. 2011
314 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/75d6c2496fab1f21d1e05e8550054244c0c15cfa
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Yilei Zhang
- Jonathan M. Williams
- Tim King
- Abhishek Srivastav
- Yixin Liu
- David C. Mauer
- Thomas Schmid
- Daniel Urban
In Finance
- Yilei Zhang
- Jonathan M. Williams
- Tim King
- Abhishek Srivastav
- Yixin Liu
- David C. Mauer
- Thomas Schmid
- Daniel Urban
In Strategy and Management
- Yilei Zhang
- Tim King
- Jonathan M. Williams
- Abhishek Srivastav
- Yixin Liu
- David C. Mauer
- Thomas Schmid
- Daniel Urban
Citations in the corpus
- The value of financial flexibility and corporate financial policy (2014, background): “Liu and Mauer (2011), for instance, use it to study CEO incentives.”
- Why Has the Value of Cash Increased Over Time? (2018, unknown): “…standardized by lagged market value, 7The model in equation (1) has been used in a number of studies to examine cross-sectional variation in the value of cash, including Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Denis and Sibilkov (2010), Liu and Mauer (2011), Harford et al. (2014), and Chen et al. (2015).”
- What’s in an education? Implications of CEO education for bank performance (2016, methodology): “Based on Coles et al. (2006) and Liu and Mauer (2011), our first instrument is CEO age.”
- Corporate cash holdings: Causes and consequences (2015, unknown): “However, Liu and Mauer (2011) find that CEO compensation providing risk-taking incentives is associated with higher levels of cash holding but this cash has lower value to shareholders.”
- Firm Cash Holdings and CEO Inside Debt (2013, methodology): “In their study of CEO equity-compensation, Liu and Mauer (2011) document that greater equity incentives as measured by the sensitivity of equity compensation to volatility (vega) are also associated with higher corporate cash holdings.”
- State Ownership, Soft-Budget Constraints, and Cash Holdings: Evidence from China's Privatized Firms (2014, unknown): “Recent studies show that the marginal value of cash declines with higher agency costs and poor corporate governance (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2003; Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 2006; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Hartford, Mansi and Maxwell, 2008; Liu and Maue”