Building the IPO Order Book: Underpricing and Participation Limits With Costly Information

By Ann E. Sherman, Sheridan Titman. 2002

429 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/757ef741440653902b6b26ab7feacf337bf7e70d

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Citations in the corpus

Financial Wealth, Socioemotional Wealth, and IPO Underpricing in Family Firms: A Two-stage Gamble Model (2017, background): “By performing duediligence, they can certify issuer quality (Titman & Trueman, 1986) and increase the likelihood of issue oversubscription (Benveniste & Spindt, 1989; Sherman & Titman, 2002), thereby helping family owners maintain control by preferentially allocating shares to smaller investors.”
Redacting Proprietary Information at the Initial Public Offering (2015, background): “literature suggests that investors are compensated for bearing greater information production costs via greater underpricing (see e.g., Sherman, 1992; Chemmanur, 1993; Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999; Sherman and Titman, 2002).”
IPO Market Timing (2005, background): “…Benveniste and Spindt (1989), this line of research has emphasized the costs of going public that arise when investors possess private information about issuers’ value [Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), Maksimovic and Pichler (2002), Sherman and Titman (2002), and Biais, Bossaerts, and Rochet (2002)].”
Discounting and underpricing in seasoned equity offers (2003, neutral): “However, our tests show 2 For a discussion of the order book, and investors’ indications of interest and price and quantity bids contained therein, in the case of unseasoned offers, see Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) and Sherman and Titman (2002).”
Allocation of initial public offerings and flipping activity (2003, neutral): “Sherman (2000) and Sherman and Titman (2002) discuss the book-building method used in IPOs.”
Litigation Risk, Strategic Disclosure and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings (2012, background): “(See, for example, Benveniste and Spindt, 1989, and Sherman and Titman, 2002 who argue that investors are compensated for revealing information about the value of the firm to the issuer and underwriter.)”
The Information Content of IPO Prospectuses (2009, positive): “As stated by Sherman and Titman (2002), " If the pricing policy provides a sufficient incentive for investors to collect information, they will also have sufficient incentive to reveal the information.”
IPO Underpricing Over the Very Long Run (2009, neutral): “Furthermore, if it is costly to generate information to underpin IPO pricing (Sherman and Titman, 2002), there should be a tradeoff between the proportion of post-issue voting equity sold in the offering (PROPSOLD) and the extent to which shares are underpriced.”
Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time (2002, positive): “Benveniste and Wilhelm (1997) and Sherman and Titman (2002) emphasize that underwriter discretion can be used to the benefit of issuing firms.”
Underwriter Networks, Investor Attention, and Initial Public Offerings (2016, positive): “nomenon, see Sherman and Titman (2002) , who show, in a setting where evaluating the IPO firm is costly to institutions, that it is more efficient for underwriters’ information extraction from institutions to concentrate”