Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A Dynamic Analysis
By Marco Battaglini, Stephen Coate. 2007
167 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/74470c1c0a0b93fb1e8de711e1a326fde9fd1880
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- T. Besley
- Ethan Ilzetzki
- Torsten Persson
- Jeffrey A. Frankel
- Guido Tabellini
- Timothy J. Besley
- W. Henisz
- Philip E. Keefer
In Political Science and International Relations
Citations in the corpus
- Weak States and Steady States: The Dynamics of Fiscal Capacity (2013, background): “In Battaglini and Coate (2007, 2008) the marginal value of the public good is always equal to the marginal cost of public funds and economic constraints limit taxation.”
- Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration (2011, unknown): “He shows that there exist stationary equilibria where, in the long run, every proposer captures the entire bene ts. Battaglini and Coate (2007; 2008) apply the dynamic legislative bargaining games to study collective choice of public investment and public debt.”
- Monetary Policy by Committee : Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority ? (2010, unknown): “However, 1 Among the theoretical contributions that examine the consequences of legislative bargaining are Baron (1991), Chari and Cole (1993), Persson et al. (2000), Battaglini and Coate (2007a, 2007b), and Volden and Wiseman (2007).”
- Mandatory versus Discretionary Spending: The Status Quo Effect (2014, unknown): “For example, a form of transfer may be returning a portion of Security and Medicare do not satisfy the “non-rivalrous” criterion, they satisfy the “nonexcludable” criterion and are therefore often thought of as a common pool resource.”