A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks

By Matthew O. Jackson, A. Wolinsky. 1996

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Citations in the corpus

The Economics of Social Networks (2005, methodology): “See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) to see extensions to other stability notions, and Jackson (2003) for details on weakening the e¢ ciency criterion.”
It's all about Connections: Evidence on Network Formation (2012, unknown): “Several theoretic models have been proposed to analyze the strategic formation of information networks with techniques from cooperative game theory (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996, Jackson 2001) and non-cooperative game theory (Bala and Goyal 2000a,b).”
The world trade network and the environment (2015, background): “These indirect effects from trade (or network effects) are what we call congestion externalities (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996).”
Strategic networks and entrepreneurial ventures (2007, background): “, Barabasi and Albert, 1999; Gould, 2002), or that they maximize a utility function that does not map easily onto the social mechanisms featured in the entrepreneurship literature (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Goyal and Joshi, 2003).”
Building up social capital in a changing world (2002, unknown): “So, as is customary in the network literature (cf. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) ), we suppose that players assess the incentives pertaining each link separately and deviations can only affect one of their links at a time.”
Risk Sharing Between Households (2011, background): “The latter is a congestion e¤ect that was rst discussed in the context of coauthor networks by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).”
A new route to the evolution of cooperation (2006, background): “Such a choice for fitness goes in line with recent studies on cooperation (Abramson & Kuperman, 2001) economics (Jackson & Wolinsky, 1996) social learning (Young, 1998) and the recently developed evolutionary graph theory (Lieberman et al., 2005).”
Financial Connections and Systemic Risk (2010, background): “An important feature of the network literature and of the equilibrium concept of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) that we have used is that banks are not able to determine the network structure.”