How Do Powerful CEOs View Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)? An Empirical Note

By P. Jiraporn, Pandej Chintrakarn. 2013

254 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/73987a3f4fd84bb672c14271ee5e4ee7fdce7587

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: Evidence from the US Banking Sector (2013, unknown): “For example, Jiraporn and Chintrakarn (2013) suggest that CEOs view CSR opportunistically to gain media coverage and enhance their own reputation.”
The Effect of Board Capital and CEO Power on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures (2016, background): “…CEO duality (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Jackling and Johl 2009), CEO ownership (Veprauskaite and Adams 2013), CEO tenure (Morck et al. 1988; Brookman and Thistle 2009) and CEO remuneration (Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Florackis and Ozkan 2009; Jiraporn and Chintrakarn 2013) as proxies of CEO power.”
It’s who you know that counts: Board connectedness and CSR performance (2020, background): “Prior literature has documented that a powerful CEO can negatively influence firms’ CSR activities (Jiraporn and Chintrakarn, 2013).”
CEO Power, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Firm Value: A Test of Agency Theory (2016, methodology): “Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2612733 In this paper, following Jiraporn and Chintrakarn (2013) we also use Bebchuck, Cremers, and Peyer’s (2011) CPS as a proxy to CEO power.”
The effect of firm maturity on corporate social responsibility (CSR): do older firms invest more in CSR? (2015, unknown): “The total of the strengths minus the concerns is the composite CSR score (Goss and Roberts 2011; Jiraporn et al. 2014; Jiraporn, and Chintrakarn, 2013a; Jiraporn and Chintrakarn 2013b).”
Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation for Corporate Social Responsibility (2015, unknown): “…CSR as a potential agency cost, finding that CSR may be used to advance personal interests over the interests of shareholders (Brown et al., 2006; Jiraporn and Chintrakarn, 2013; Borghesi et al., 2014; Cheng et al., 2014; Kruger, 2014; Masulis and Reza, 2014), provide added job security to…”