The dynamic relationship between CEO duality and firm performance: The moderating role of board independence
By Augustine Duru, Raghavan J. Iyengar, Ernest M. Zampelli. 2016
386 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/72f974a218ec5ffb141667629268f5c9daea295f
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In Accounting
In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Citations in the corpus
- The Effects of Market Competition, Capital Structure, and CEO Duality on Firm Performance: A Mediation Analysis by Incorporating the GMM Model Technique (2020, methodology): “Furthermore, a CEO duality structure decreases a firm’s performance because it creates agency problems among managers and shareholders [20].”
- CEO Duality, Agency Costs, and Internal Capital Allocation Efficiency (2019, neutral): “In a similar vein, Duru et al. (2016) show that the negative effect of CEO duality on firm performance is attenuated by the degree of board independence.”