Stuxnet: Dissecting a Cyberwarfare Weapon

By Ralph Langner. IEEE Security and Privacy, 2011

1,803 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Information Systems, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/72a3e02eccf9872c7080645d936b5564d356ecfa

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Citations in the corpus

A Systematic Survey of Industrial Internet of Things Security: Requirements and Fog Computing Opportunities (2020, neutral): “In fact, traditional industrial environments have been subject to attacks in the past, sometimes with devastating results (e.g., StuxNet [5] or CrashOverride/Industroyer [6]).”
A Survey of Physics-Based Attack Detection in Cyber-Physical Systems (2018, neutral): “…or the power grid (electromagnetics) can be used to create time-series models that we can false control signals like manipulating vehicle platoons [27], manipulating demand-response systems [98], and the sabotage Stuxnet [25, 54] created by manipulating the rotation frequency of centrifuges.”
Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey (2017, background): “Windows released Stuxnet-related security patches, without which, Stuxnet would have still been present [83].”
CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies The Power of Cache Attacks (2017, background): “Due to the high complexity and various attack surfaces in modern computing systems, keeping an entire system secure is usually unrealistic [19,33].”
Cloud-enabled prognosis for manufacturing (2015, background): “Developed to target Iranian efforts to enrich uranium, Stuxnet exploits the SCADA’s dynamic-link library (DLL), through which SCADA receives information about the system being controlled [275].”
Unsolved Problems in ML Safety (2021, background): “Since cyberattacks can destroy valuable information and even destroy critical physical infrastructure [33] such as power grids [136] and building hardware [115], these potential attacks are a looming threat to international security.”
On the feasibility of online malware detection with performance counters (2013, background): “Also, government-funded agencies (allegedly) have created sophisticated malware that target speciﬁc computers for espionage or sabotage [4, 5, 6].”
The Effect of IoT New Features on Security and Privacy: New Threats, Existing Solutions, and Challenges Yet to Be Solved (2018, background): “For example, Stuxnet worm could infect the Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) used in industrial control systems, which result in considerable physical damage.”
Multilayer Data-Driven Cyber-Attack Detection System for Industrial Control Systems Based on Network, System, and Process Data (2019, background): “In 2010, Stuxnet attacked Iranian nuclear enrichment centrifuges, causing severe equipment damage [2].”
A Survey on Advanced Persistent Threats: Techniques, Solutions, Challenges, and Research Opportunities (2019, background): “Several reports were published by researchers and ﬁrms across the world, with more or less conﬂicting information on the detailed execution of Stuxnet as in [28] and [29].”
Event-Triggered State Observers for Sparse Sensor Noise/Attacks (2013, neutral): “THE security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) has recently become a topic of scientific inquiry in no small part due to the discovery of the Stuxnet malware, the most famous example of an attack on process control systems [1].”
Limiting the Impact of Stealthy Attacks on Industrial Control Systems (2016, methodology): “Our work is motivated by false sensor measurements [35, 58] or false control signals like manipulating vehicle platoons [19], manipulating demand-response systems [58], and the sabotage Stuxnet created by manipulating the rotation frequency of centrifuges [17, 32].”