Information and the Cost of Capital

By David A. Easley, Maureen O’Hara. 2004

3,046 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/720124bf60271642f956d156ded1c8c58aea15e9

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Christian Leuz
2. Peter D. Wysocki
3. Martin Walker
4. Jeong‐Bon Kim
5. Beatriz García Osma
6. Rodrigo S. Verdi
7. Juan Manuel García Lara
8. Shivaram Rajgopal

In Finance

1. Christian Leuz
2. Peter D. Wysocki
3. Daniel A. Cohen
4. Rodrigo S. Verdi
5. Shivaram Rajgopal
6. Martin Walker
7. Jeong‐Bon Kim
8. Mohan Venkatachalam

Citations in the corpus

• Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior (2016, positive): “Moreover, this information could reduce information asymmetry between management and shareholders, thereby reducing the cost of capital or increasing liquidity [Botosan 1997; Easley and O'hara 2004].”
• SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure, Information, and the Cost of Capital (2007, neutral): “, Easley and O’Hara (2003) who link the firm’s information environment to its cost of capital.”
• Factoring Information Into Returns (2010, positive): “Easley and O’Hara (2004) constructed such a model to explain how pin as a characteristic could be priced in the cross section.”
• Idiosyncratic Return Volatility and the Information Quality Underlying Managerial Discretion (2012, background): “2 O’Hara (2003), and Easley and O’Hara (2004) present information-risk models and demonstrate that returns are positively related to information asymmetry when a lack of public information forces investors to rely more on private information.”
• Microstructure and Ambiguity (2010, background): “How then to increase participation in a market? We know from a growing body of research (see, for example, Gilboa and Schmeider[1989]; Cao, Wang and Zhang [2003]; Easley and O’Hara [2005]) that a factor influencing participation is ambiguity aversion.”
• Liquidity and Asset Prices (2005, positive): “This result obtains because, in expectation, the future 17 Recent static models of asymmetric information and asset prices include Easley and O’Hara (2004) and O’Hara (2003).”
• Local Ownership as Private Information: Evidence on the Monitoring-Liquidity Trade-Off (2007, background): “The presence of a better-informed party increases the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, making the stock less liquid (e.g. Kyle, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 2004).”