CEO Optimism and Forced Turnover

By T. C. Campbell, Michael F. Gallmeyer, Shane A. Johnson, Jessica, M. Rutherford, B. Stanley. 2011

740 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/70d99ebc5c2dd72c0de7f8ba91af07fbdafaf4ce

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Citations in the corpus

Overconfidence, Compensation Contracts, and Capital Budgeting (2011, background): “is Campbell et al.’s (2010) finding that excessive CEO overconfidence is associated with more frequent failure and forced turnover.”
Are employee-friendly workplaces conducive to innovation? (2016, methodology): “Following Campbell et al. (2011), we estimat he average CEO stock option moneyness for each year using the Execucomp data as follows.”
The Origin of Failure: A Multidisciplinary Appraisal of the Hubris Hypothesis and Proposed Research Agenda (2014, background): “Nonetheless, while managerial self-confidence positively influences firm performance, beyond a certain point the influence of hubris may be negative (Campbell et al., 2011).”
Local Gambling Preferences and Corporate Innovative Success (2014, methodology): “Since we do not have detailed data on the CEO’s option holdings and exercise prices for each option grant, we follow Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley (2011) in calculating an average moneyness of the CEO’s option port-folio for each year.”
Overconfidence and investment: An experimental approach (2017, methodology): “Campbell et al. (2011) theoretically show that overconfidence reduces the underinvestment resulting from CEOs’ risk aversion and, subsequently, moderately overconfident and risk-averse CEOs invest at a level closer to the one preferred by risk-neutral shareholders.”
Are Overconfident CEOs Better Leaders? Evidence from Stakeholder Commitments (2017, positive): “9 from Execucomp, we compute the average moneyness of the CEO’s option holdings annually following the approach in Campbell et al. (2011), Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011), Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012), and Banerjee, Humphrey-Jenner, and Nanda (2015).”
Does managerial ability facilitate corporate innovative success (2015, positive): “Likewise, Chen et al. (2015) show that employee treatment schemes improve the number and significance of innovative inventions as well as the stock market‟s valuation of these inventions.”
CEO Overconfidence and Stock Price Crash Risk (2016, positive): “Following Kim et al. (2011b), we also calculate the three crash risk measures using firm-specific weekly returns over the future two- and three-year periods and find that the relation between CEO overconfidence and future crash risk continues to be positive and significant.”
CEO network centrality and merger performance (2015, background): “acquisitions, the acquisition gains, the likelihood of subsequent firm takeover and the likelihood of CEO turnover) is virtually identical when we specifically control for the measures of CEO (over)confidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Campbell et al., 2011).”