Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach

By Mike Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. de Vries. Social Science Research Network, 2005

154 citations recorded by the source corpus.

A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown by the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skillful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems. The British rule, American rule, and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/701b196924de77b0a5e729c19f83fd616dfa99bc

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In Economics and Econometrics

  1. Emmanuel Dechenaux
  2. Dan Kovenock
  3. Roman M. Sheremeta
  4. Subhasish M. Chowdhury
  5. Kai A. Konrad

In Management Science and Operations Research

  1. Emmanuel Dechenaux
  2. Roman M. Sheremeta
  3. Dan Kovenock
  4. Subhasish M. Chowdhury

Citations in the corpus