OPTIMAL INSURANCE DESIGN UNDER RANK‐DEPENDENT EXPECTED UTILITY

By Carole Bernard, Xue Dong He, Jia-An Yan, Xun Yu Zhou. 2015

105 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/70163ba555e066133d874544c797e411d9f29214

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In Demography

1. Jun Cai
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Citations in the corpus

• Optimal insurance under rank‐dependent utility and incentive compatibility (2015, unknown): “As a consequence, insured may be motivated to either hide or exaggerate their true losses (see a discussion on Bernard et al., 2015, pp. 175– 176). In one of the earliest papers on moral hazard in the context of insurance contract design, Huberman, Mayers, and Smith (1983) considered an optimal inde”
• Pareto-Optimal Reinsurance Arrangements Under General Model Settings (2017, background): “…distortion risk measures, general law-invariant convex risk measures, and insurer’s risk–adjusted liability, respectively, Kaluszka and Okolewski (2008) and Cai and Wei (2012) for maximization of the expected utility, and Bernard et al. (2015) for maximization of rank-dependent expected utility.”