Foundations of Secure Interactive Computing
By Donald Beaver. 1991
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Yehuda Lindell
- Benny Pinkas
- Carmit Hazay
- Stacey Truex
- Yan Huang
- David E. Evans
- Nathalie Baracaldo
- Heiko Ludwig
Citations in the corpus
- A Hybrid Approach to Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning (2018, background): “since its introduction in [3] and application to data mining in [27].”
- Secure Multiparty Computation for Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (2009, background): “A similar analysis follows in the case that (4) holds.”
- Fast Cut-and-Choose-Based Protocols for Malicious and Covert Adversaries (2013, background): “Informally speaking, a protocol is then secure if no real adversary attacking the real protocol can do more harm than an ideal adversary (or simulator) who interacts in the ideal model [12,10,24,2,4,11].”
- A Proof of Security of Yao’s Protocol for Two-Party Computation (2009, background): “The definition of security that has become standard today [10, 11, 1, 4] blends these two conditions.”
- Foundations of Cryptography: Volume 1, Basic Tools (2001, unknown): “One minimalistic instantiation of the definitional approach of [165, 11, 12] is presented in [45] and is shown to satisfy the main conceptual concerns.”
- Efficient Protocols for Set Intersection and Pattern Matching with Security Against Malicious and Covert Adversaries (2008, background): “[6] following [5,14,21]) formalizes security by comparing a real protocol execution to an “ideal execution,” where an incorruptible trusted party helps the parties to compute the function.”
- An Efficient Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries (2007, background): “The following description and definition is based on [9, Chapter 7], which in turn follows [12,22,4,5].”
- Secure Two-Party Computation via Cut-and-Choose Oblivious Transfer (2011, background): “Informally speaking, a protocol is then secure if no real adversary attacking the real protocol can do more harm than an ideal adversary (or simulator) who interacts in the ideal model [2,3,14,15,32].”
- Secure Multiparty Computation (2011, methodology): “Beaver [1] introduced the following methodology for definin g secure multiparty computation.”
- Parallel Coin-Tossing and Constant-Round Secure Two-Party Computation (2001, background): “The actual definition [14,1,5] blends these two conditions (see Section 2).”