The Shapley Value of a Patent Licensing Game: the Asymptotic Equivalence to Non-cooperative Results

By Y. Tauman, Naoki Watanabe. 2006

53 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management of Technology and Innovation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6e32e0e782ca7e4e7d462c40b0c15ad0cf5094a9

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In Economics and Econometrics

1. Anna B. Khmelnitskaya

Citations in the corpus

• Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications (2007, background): “…the Core is the set-valued solution assigning to game v the (possibly empty) set One of the most applied point-valued solutions for cooperative TU-games is the Shapley value, which is applied to economic allocation problems in Graham et al. (1990), Maniquet (2003) and Tauman and Watanabe (2006).”