TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common Mitigations
By Wesley M. Eddy. Request for Comments, 2007
360 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This document describes TCP SYN flooding attacks, which have been well-known to the community for several years. Various countermeasures against these attacks, and the trade-offs of each, are described. This document archives explanations of the attack and common defense techniques for the benefit of TCP implementers and administrators of TCP servers or networks, but does not make any standards-level recommendations. This memo provides information for the Internet community.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Hardware and Architecture
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6d172400b437bab951937325a772631a2ecfeca2
How researchers see this paper
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In Artificial Intelligence
- Patrick Drew McDaniel
- Jennifer Rexford
- Kevin R. B. Butler
- Toni R. Farley
- Nicolas Papernot
- Nicholas Carlini
- Ian J. Goodfellow
- Dawn Song
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Patrick Drew McDaniel
- Jennifer Rexford
- Kevin R. B. Butler
- Toni R. Farley
- Danda B. Rawat
- S. Reddy
- Mosharaf Chowdhury
In Hardware and Architecture
Citations in the corpus
- A Survey of BGP Security Issues and Solutions (2010, methodology): “This SYN flooding attack [14] would consume Bob’s connection state memory, leaving Bob unable to perform any TCP transactions.”