Tax Reforms and Tax Compliance: The Divergent Paths of Chile and Argentina

By Marcelo Bergman. 2003

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Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The "slippery slope" framework (2008, background): “Accordingly, a comparison of the Chilean and Argentine tax system showed that credible sanctions under legitimate power are an effective tool for achieving higher trust levels and consequently higher compliance rates (Bergman, 2003).”
How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance (2007, background): “In explaining why the Chilean tax administration is so much more efficient than its Argentinean counterpart, Bergman points out that, in Chile, one department collects and manages the money while another assesses liabilities and enforces the law.”
Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations (2019, background): “…through hiring qualified tax inspectors, setting higher audit rates, and imposing steeper penalties may be interpreted as an efficient and justifiable way to mitigate tax evasion by compliant taxpayers, leading them to trust and comply to a greater degree (e.g., Bergman, 2003; Wenzel, 2003).”