Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and Sovereign Debt: Britain 1690–1790
By N. Sussman, Yishay Yafeh. Journal Economic History, 2006
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We revisit the evidence on the relations between institutions, the cost of government debt, and financial development in Britain (1690–1790) and find that interest rates remained high and volatile for four decades after the Glorious Revolution, partly due to wars and instability; British interest rates co-moved with those in Holland; Debt per capita remained lower in Britain than in Holland until around 1780; and Britain did not borrow at lower rates than European countries with more limited protection of property rights. We conclude that, in the short run, institutional reforms are not rewarded by financial markets.
Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6c7628c9772f3d192b8b6b768c0d273d86b6b31c
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Citations in the corpus
- Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective (2014, background): “Sussman and Yafeh (2006), too, found that interest rates on British government debt did not show any discontinuity after the Glorious Revolution, instead remaining high and volatile for another forty years.”