Endogenizing institutions and institutional changes*

By Masahiko Aoki. Journal of Institutional Economics, 2007

422 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6bdea9245c6d1f1464dec38a4ac135c1afe79b32

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Citations in the corpus

Institutions: Rules or Equilibria? (2011, background): “A notable contribution is Aoki (2007) who proposes that as an existing equilibrium breaks down, cognitively limited agents perceive that their former strategies are no long optimal, without necessarily understanding why, and begin to experiment with new strategies.”
Applying institutional theory to the low-carbon energy transition (2016, positive): “Institutions allow actors to make decisions with little information and they become progressively reinforced by repetition of these decisions, provided the actors find that the validity of their decisions and actions is confirmed [7].”
The natural selection of bad science (2016, background): “is a driving motivation for this presentation. Institutional change is difﬁcult to accomplish, because it requires coordination on a large scale, which is often costly to early adopters (North, 1990; Aoki, 2007). Yet such change is needed to insure the integrity of science. It is therefore worth con”
Governing Institutional Complexity: The Ecology of Games Framework (2013, neutral): “Even within the context of one institution, different actors will perceive different payoffs from playing the game (Aoki, 2007).”
Institutions and economic development: theory, policy and history (2010, background): “Third, some other times, potentially beneficial institutional changes are not made because only simultaneous changes in complementary institutions can bring about enough benefits (Aoki, 2007).”
Institutions, rules, and equilibria: a unified theory* (2014, methodology): “In the first part of this paper we have merged the rule-based and the equilibrium-based approaches, along the lines of Aoki (2001, 2007, 2011) and Grief and Kingston (2011), into a unitary framework that we have called the ‘rules-in-equilibrium’ account.”
Comparative and International Corporate Governance (2010, background): “Similarly, Aoki (2007) argues that Any model useful for examining the nature of an institution and conditions for its self-enforceability is likely to need to specify a player D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ F r i e d r i c h A l t h o f f K o n s o r t i u m ] A t : 1 5 : 0 2 6 J u l y 2 0 1 0 532 •…”