HOW PROBABILITIES REFLECT EVIDENCE

By James M. Joyce. 2005

229 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6a7e396bf24e21200bb15e9593dcc2f86a05c2e4

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

1. S. Siegel
2. A. Elga

In History and Philosophy of Science

1. S. Siegel
2. A. Elga

In Philosophy

1. S. Siegel
2. A. Elga

Citations in the corpus

• Subjective Probabilities should be Sharp (2010, background): “Or perhaps the spread should be represented not by having an interval range, but rather by having your state of belief represented by a set of probability functions rather than a single one, as in Levi (1980), Jeffrey (1983), Joyce (2005), Kaplan (1996) and van Fraassen (2006).”
• The Rationality of Perception (2016, background): “2 For more on the distinction between resilience and evidential support in a Bayesian framework, see Joyce (2005) Susanna Siegel * To appear in Res Philosophica, 2018 8 apart from how well the system does as a whole at blocking or allowing new information to get to the subject.”