How Changes in Financial Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment

By Rafael Lalive, J. van Ours, Josef Zweimüller. Social Science Research Network, 2006

346 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper studies how changes in the two key parameters of unemployment insurance - the benefit replacement rate (RR) and the potential duration of benefits (PBD) - affect the duration of unemployment.In 1989, the Austrian government made unemployment insurance more generous by changing, simultaneously, the maximum duration of regular unemployment benefits and the earnings replacement ratio.We find that increasing the replacement ratio has much weaker disincentive effects than increasing the maximum duration of benefits.We use these results to split up the total costs to unemployment insurance funds into costs due to changes in the unemployment insurance system and costs due to behavioral responses of unemployed workers.Results indicate that costs due to behavioral responses are substantial.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Health Professions

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/69b7b8acf2e29e5f54250476ea9108c76a94df5b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

  1. Andrea Weber
  2. Arash Nekoei
  3. J. van Ours
  4. Josef Zweimüller
  5. Paul R. Rosenbaum
  6. Guido Schwerdt
  7. Milan Vodopivec
  8. R. Winter‐Ebmer

In General Health Professions

  1. Paul R. Rosenbaum
  2. Andrea Weber
  3. Josef Zweimüller
  4. Arash Nekoei
  5. J. van Ours
  6. R. Winter‐Ebmer
  7. Andrea Ichino
  8. David Card

Citations in the corpus