Consistency in house allocation problems

By Haluk Ergin. 2000

96 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/690ac1de125a10b105482fce3f31105f704e4ffb

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In Artificial Intelligence

William Thomson

In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources (2009, unknown): “Theorem 10 (Ergin 2000) In the house allocation problem, a mechanism is Pareto-effi cient, (weakly) neutral, and consistent if and only if it is equivalent to a serial dictatorship.”
Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources (2015, unknown): “For instance, in a serial dictatorship (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981; Svensson, 1994, 1999; Ergin, 2000), which is a special case of trading cycles, the first dictator chooses his most preferred object, then a second dictator chooses his most preferred object among the objects which were not”
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003, unknown): “Ergin (2000), Szilvia Pápai (2000), James Schummer (2000), Anna Bogomolnaia and Hervé Moulin (2001), Eiichi Miyagawa (2001, 2002), Lars Ehlers (2002), Ehlers et al. (2002) a version of this mechanism has been used in the United States hospital-intern market (Roth and Elliot Peranson, 1997, 1999).”
Fair Allocation Rules (2011, background): “13 (Ergin, 2000) Domain: a set of objects; strict preferences over individual objects.”
Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems (2002, background): “If the rule is based on a partition of all singletons, then it is a serial dictatorship(see, for example,Ergin, 2000; Svensson, 1999), in which each agent gets his favorite object among the objects that were not assigned to agents who precede this agent in the priority ordering.”