Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism

By Ingo Brigandt. Philosophia Scientiæ, 2003

95 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/682d666e683798749bf6fe230b19a32a47d9bc2e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

1. Marc Ereshefsky
2. Robert A. Wilson

In History and Philosophy of Science

1. Marc Ereshefsky
2. Ingo Brigandt
3. Robert A. Wilson

In Philosophy

1. Marc Ereshefsky
2. Ingo Brigandt
3. Robert A. Wilson

Citations in the corpus

• When Traditional Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds (2007, background): “In fact, these features are usually causally interwoven, thereby creating the biological units recognized as species (Brigandt 2003).”
• Microbiology and the species problem (2010, background): “Given the nature of prokaryotes, the idea that there is a common species phenomenon ( Brigandt 2003; Griffiths 2006) does not save the species category, nor does the suggestion that ‘species’ is a family resemblance concept (Pigliucci 2003; Wilson et al. 2009).”