Having a body versus moving your body: How agency structures body-ownership.
By Manos Tsakiris, G. Prabhu, Patrick Haggard. Consciousness and Cognition, 2006
618 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Psychiatry and Mental health, Social Psychology
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/681a2cc435dcf1a6ade34713105c4734877a51d9
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Mel Slater
- Maria V. Sanchez-Vives
- H. Ehrsson
- Manos Tsakiris
- Konstantina Kilteni
- Daniel Pérez-Marcos
- Raphaela Groten
- Tabitha C. Peck
In Psychiatry and Mental health
- Mel Slater
- H. Ehrsson
- Konstantina Kilteni
- Raphaela Groten
- Manos Tsakiris
- Ilias Bergstrom
- Patrick Haggard
- Mog Stapleton
In Social Psychology
- Mel Slater
- Raphaela Groten
- Konstantina Kilteni
- Maria V. Sanchez-Vives
- H. Ehrsson
- Tabitha C. Peck
- Mar González-Franco
- Manos Tsakiris
Citations in the corpus
- Moving a Rubber Hand that Feels Like Your Own: A Dissociation of Ownership and Agency (2012, neutral): “Tsakiris et al. (2006) compared the strength of ownership, as by proprioceptive drift alone, in video-based conditions with active movements, passive movements, or a version of the classic rubber hand illusion in which relaxed hands were brushed.”
- The Sense of Embodiment in Virtual Reality (2012, background): “…hand and arm; for example, rubber arm and hand (Botvi-nick & Cohen, 1998), screen images of the real hands (IJsselsteijn, de Kort, & Haans, 2006; Tsakiris et al., 2006), other people’s hands (Schutz-Bosbach, Mancini, phenomenology of embodiment includes the sense of self-location, interpreted…”
- Inducing Illusory Ownership of a Virtual Body (2009, methodology): “Neurons in multisensory areas that integrate this type of information could implement the necessary neuronal computations causing changes in body ownership (Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005; Makin et al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2006).”
- Drumming in Immersive Virtual Reality: The Body Shapes the Way We Play (2013, background): “In general, numerous studies in cognitive neuroscience and psychology have demonstrated that a fake body-part or a fake body can be illusorily experienced as the real body-part or the real body respectively, when the fake and real both receive spatiotemporally congruent multisensory and/or sensorimo”
- Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories (2009, background): “feeling of body ownership can extend to prostheses (Tsakiris et al. 2006).”
- Habeas Corpus: The Sense of Ownership of One ' s Own Body (2007, background): “A recent experiment shows that both afferent and efferent aspects of the moving body can infl uence the sense of ownership ( Tsakiris et al. , 2006 ).”
- Avatar Embodiment. Towards a Standardized Questionnaire (2018, background): “…to agency) has been shown to further enhance embodiment, perhaps with a stronger influence of the illusion than visuo-tactile stimulation alone since the former only tackles body ownership while the later addresses both agency and body ownership (Tsakiris et al., 2006; Kokkinara and Slater, 2014).”
- What is embodiment? A psychometric approach. (2008, neutral): “The presence of ownership following synchronous stimulation does not necessarily cause a corresponding positive sense of agency, suggesting that these are dissociable aspects of experience (cf. Sato & Yasuda, 2005; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, in press; Tsakiris et al., 2006).”
- The role of interaction in virtual embodiment: Effects of the virtual hand representation (2016, background): “For example, when controlling virtual avatars, the sense of agency appears even when the avatars are not realistic (such as point-line avatars [37]), when virtual avatars drastically deviate from the physical body [16] or with virtual limbs in implausible positions [35].”
- Neural signatures of body ownership: a sensory network for bodily self-consciousness. (2007, background): “Intersensory matching may be sufficient for body ownership, even in the absence of agency, because somatosensory signals clearly relate to the self even in the absence of voluntary movement ( Tsakiris et al. 2005, 2006 ).”