The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion

By Daniel W. Drezner. International Organization, 2003

362 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/678bac93c4696586f25df20990c473efb0c8b05a

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Citations in the corpus

The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions (2007, background): “In order to address this problem, Drezner (2001, 2003) surveys cases in which sanctions were imposed in pursuit of economic or regulatory goals.”
Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset (2014, background): “…particular, a number of scholars argued that, since potential targets can adjust their behavior before sanctions are imposed in anticipation of the potential costs, sanctions might be more effective at the threat stage than at the imposition stage (Drezner 2003; Morgan and Miers 1999; Smith 1996).”
The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions (2014, background): “See Lacy and Niou 2004; Drezner 2003; and Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005.”
Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression (2005, background): “…information has been presented+36 Moreover, when belief change does take place, it often happens in stages, as individuals pass through intermedi- 33+ See Drezner 2003; and Eaton and Engers 1999+ 34+ The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ~OECD! concludes, for example, that the…”
Claims to Legitimacy Matter: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes (2014, neutral): “ Despite contrasting theoretical expectations about the effectiveness of threatened sanctions (Drezner 2003; Mor‐ gan et al.”
When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature (2019, background): “Studies show that multilateral sanctions under the auspices of international institutions are more effective than those by a single country or an ad hoc coalition of a few countries (Martin 1992; Miers and Clifton Morgan 2002; Drezner 2000, 2003; Bapat and Morgan 2009; Early and Spice 2015).”
Globalization, harmonization, and competition: the different pathways to policy convergence (2005, background): “However, there is strong empirical evidence that the threat or use of sanctions can yield significant concessions in regulatory disputes (Drezner 2003 ).”
State-owned MNCs and host country expropriation risk: The role of home state soft power and economic gunboat diplomacy (2014, background): “More importantly, successful threats need not to be executed (Drezner, 2003).”